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FEMALE ACTIVITY CHOICE IN A DUAL CONTEXT: 







The estimation of models of activity choice in LDCs (Less Developed 
Countries) is complicated by specific features of labour markets. In particular, entry into 
activity sectors is often restricted and worked hours are rationed. Moreover, in the 
informal sector workers may obtain their work rewards directly through technology 
with decreasing returns to labour.  
In this situation, complex structural modelling is often reputed infeasible. In this 
paper, we show that this statement is exaggerated and that it is possible to 
simultaneously estimate preferences, informal technology and sector entry costs. 
We estimate a structural non-separable model of activity choice and labour 
supply of female workers for formal, informal and inactivity sectors in the capital city 
of Cameroon. Our results provide evidence for the concavity in hours of the earnings 
function in the informal sector. We also estimate significant effects for several 
explanatory variables of the preferences and the earnings function. This allows us to 
contrast the labour supply elasticities for different sectors in a structural framework.  
However, estimation using a small sample is difficult and requires strong 
restrictions. In particular, there exists a trade-off between incorporating many 
explanatory variables in the model, and accounting for the non-linearity and the 
consistency of the structural explanation. These difficulties raise questions about the 
interpretation of simple models that are not simultaneously based on preferences, 
technology and entry costs. 
JEL codes: J22, J23, O17. 
Keywords: Structural Models, Self-Employment, Activity Choice, Formal and 
Informal Sectors.   3
1. Introduction 
Modelling activity choice in LDCs (Less Developed Countries) is made difficult 
by specific features of labour markets. Labour markets in developing countries are more 
often characterised by dualism
1 than by perfect competition. The existence of activities 
with diminishing return to labour in the traditional sector and entry costs in the modern 
sector is a specific feature of this dualism, especially when the informal sector is 
involved. Moreover, the large gap between real wages in both sectors induces workers 
in the traditional sector to migrate to the modern sector. In view of this, when modelling 
the activity choice of workers, one should compare the rewards obtained in different 
sectors. These rewards result from different technologies or markets, and may involve 
non-linearities in worked hours. Several attempts at estimating such models have been 
carried out in the context of labour markets
2. 
The aim of this article is to extend the structural modelling of activity choice and 
labour supply based on comparison of wage rates, to more general cases involving entry 
costs, rationing of hours and non-linear earning functions
3. In such a situation, the Roy 
model (Roy, 1951) and the separation of decisions are no longer valid and an integrated 
structural model of preferences, technologies and entry costs must be estimated. Our 
goal is to use new modelling methods to deal with limitations of past approaches. We 
describe our integrated non-separable model in Section 2. In Section 3, we discuss the 
data used for the estimation. We derive in Section 4 the likelihood function of the 
structural model, discuss the explanatory variables and present the estimation results. 
Our results provide evidence for the concavity in hours of the earnings function in the 
informal sector. We can also estimate significant effects for several explanatory 
variables of the preferences and the earnings function. This allows us to contrast the 
                                                 
1 Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961), Sen (1966), Myint (1985), Behrman (1999). 
2 Benjamin (1992), Jacoby (1993), Lemieux, Fortin and Fréchette (1994), Newman and Gertler (1994). 
3 These three elements may be considered as stemming from market imperfections. However, calling 
these features “imperfections” is merely a way of collecting together several characteristics differing from 
the standard labour supply model. In particular, it is debatable whether the lack of flexibility of the hours 
in the informal sector is evidence of imperfections. Rigid hours schedules in modern industries may result 
from the constraints of a complex technology, in contrast with informal jobs that are much less dependent 
on fixed capital. Thus, entry costs, diminishing returns to labour in the informal earnings function and 
rationing of hours may be associated with market imperfections by some economists and not by others.   4
labour supply elasticities for different sectors in a structural framework. Finally, we 
conclude in Section 5. 
2. The  Model 
2.1. The  approach   
In LDCs, urban workers can choose between varied work and earnings 
perspectives. The recent empirical literature often distinguishes the formal sector (or 
primary sector), the informal sector (or secondary sector), and the non-participation
4. 
Although our data do not allow the estimation of a full model with four sectors, a fourth 
important sector would be unemployment, which we regroup here with non-
participation. Another reason for this regrouping is that it is unclear how to define 
unemployment in a poor LDC without a developed social insurance system.  
Almost by definition in the segmented market literature, the primary sector is 
characterised by high wages, high returns to education and to on-the-job training, and a 
concentrated weekly schedule of hours. In contrast, in the secondary sector, wages are 
generally low. Moreover, in this sector earnings may be a non-linear function of the 
worked hours when they directly originate from produced output. The rates of return to 
education or experience are expected to be low or non-existent in the secondary sector. 
Moreover, the weekly hours are much more variable than in the primary sector.  
We account for these characteristics in our structural model. First, we describe 
the rationing of the job supply in the primary sector by entry costs and by rationing of 
hours. To simplify the model we assume that entry costs only exist in the primary 
sector
5. This does not imply that every worker in the secondary sector is necessarily 
rationed since she may have chosen the secondary sector even without the entry costs 
                                                 
4 See Dickens and Lang (1985, 1992), Hill (1988), Chiswick (1988), Magnac (1991), Coate and Tennyson 
(1992), Vijverberg (1993), Lemieux, Fortin, Fréchette (1994), Tiefenthaler (1994), Hill (1994), Pradhan 
(1994). The case of a large number of sectors is dealt with in Dahl (2002). 
5 One could also imagine that there are different entry costs in the primary sector for workers coming 
from unemployment and the secondary sector. We do not treat the rationing process in such detail and we 
consider that the job rationing corresponding to unemployed workers is exogenous to focus on the links 
between primary and secondary labour markets.   5
because her productivity is higher in this sector. Second, we also avoid representing 
activity choices resulting from comparisons of wage (or shadow wage) linear 
functions
6. Finally, the literature generally deals with endogeneity problems with 
recursivity assumptions or with two-stage estimation methods. In contrast, we specify a 
non-recursive and non-linear model of activity choice. 
Some non-linearity in our model arises from diminishing returns to labour. In 
most applications, the informal sector wage is measured with the average hourly 
income. This is incorrect if the earnings function is a non-linear function of the worked 
hours and if the informal sector is quasi-autarkic in labour, with the tasks for the 
worker’s firm carried out by the worker herself. In this situation, in the informal sector 
the marginal productivity of labour can be very different from the market wage rates of 
workers of the same qualification, since these workers are not perfect substitutes of 
family members in the informal firm. Consequently, for the informal sector, we specify 
a labour earnings function that is concave in the worked hours because many workers 
directly get the returns from their production
7. This is in contrast with most of the 
literature on the informal sector where an earnings function linear in hours is estimated
8. 
To simplify we neglect the intra-family interactions
9. When the earnings function in the 
labour-autarkic informal sector is non-linear in hours, or when there are entry costs and 
hours rationing in the formal sector, wages are no longer the sole information needed to 
explain sector choices. Moreover, sector choice and labour supply are no longer 
separable. They are obtained by the comparison of indirect utility levels, specific to 
each sector.  
One simplifying strategy, different from the separability assumption, is to carry 
out the estimation in two steps to avoid a simultaneous non-linear estimation
10. Indeed, 
the FIML of a non-separable non-linear model with several sectors is often deemed 
‘unfeasible’ and to our best knowledge, there has never been a full information 
estimation of it. In this respect, it is difficult to understand, especially when explicit 
                                                 
6 Roy (1951), Todaro (1971), Chiswick (1988), Magnac (1991), Jacoby (1993), Pradhan (1994), Dahl 
(2002). 
7 like in Rosenzweig (1988), Lemieux, Fortin and Fréchette (1994). 
8 Vijverberg (1993), Hill (1994). 
9 like in Newman and Gertler (1994). 
10 e.g., in Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987), Jacoby (1993), Newman and Gertler (1994).   6
distribution assumptions are made, how the properties of the usual reduced-form 
estimators can be considered satisfactory when the FIML efficient approach has failed. 
What we endeavour in this paper is the FIML estimation of a complex model of activity 
choice. Because such estimation is difficult and to facilitate the maximisation of the 
likelihood of the model, we focus on the choices of female active members in the 
household
11, as it is recognised that female labour supply is more flexible than male 
labour supply
12.  
Following our foregoing discussion, we propose a model of activity choice and 
labour supply with entry cost and hours rationing in the primary sector, and a concave 
earnings function in the secondary sector. As usual in the applied literature, the entry 
cost is a stylised way to treat the rationing process in the formal sector. Is it the right 
way to do it? We choose this approach first because it corresponds to clear intuitions (a 
fixed bribe to access some advantages, a fixed amount of clothing expenditure to be 
able to apply for a formal job); second because it is related to standard labour supply 
models based on fixed costs, and third because it leads to tractable estimation.  
The error terms of the model are entered in the preferences, the fixed cost and 
the concave earnings function of the informal sector. These errors can be correlated 
because of unobserved heterogeneity and measurement problems jointly affecting these 
three elements of the model. As a counterpart to the increased sophistication of the 
model, we keep the number of considered sectors at a minimum and we assume that the 
wage rate in the primary sector is exogenous because of institutional constraints and to 
simplify the estimation
13. We now turn to the optimisation program of the female 
worker. 
2.2. Definition  of  the optimisation regimes 
Three undamental structures determine the optimisation regimes: the preferences 
of the worker, her earnings function in the secondary sector and the entry cost in the 
                                                 
11 Female members working simultaneously in two different jobs are rare in our sample (8 percent of 
workers) and we ignore this element of the activity choice. 
12 Killingsworth (1983). 
13 Coate and Tennyson (1992) propose a theoretical model with labour supply and self-employment 
where the choice of skill investment is endogenous. However, this model is not accompanied by any 
empirical application.   7
primary sector. The preferences of the individual over consumption  (c) and worked 
hours (h) are represented either with a direct utility function (U(c, h)), or with the 
corresponding indirect utility function (Ψ (w, y)), where w is the wage rate and y is the 
exogenous income. We assume as usual that the indirect utility function is strictly 
monotonically increasing in y and strictly monotonically increasing and strictly quasi-
convex in w. The Marshallian labour supply function obtained from Ψ (w, y) through 
Roy’s identity is denoted h(w, y).  
The labour earnings function in the secondary sector, R(h), is such that R'(h) > 0 
and R"(h) < 0, allowing for decreasing return to labour. Consistently with the quasi-
autarkic imperfect labour market associated with informal activities, only the labour of 
the individual enters the subjacent production function.  
To simplify, the entry cost in the primary sector is assumed to be fixed. More 
complex specifications did not lead to a converging estimation. We consider that only 
the entry cost (f) in the primary sector matters, and we neglect a possible entry cost in 
the secondary sector. Moreover, consistently with the descriptive statistics shown 
below, any job in the primary sector is supposed to correspond to fixed hours, h, and to 
a given hourly wage rate w.  
In these conditions, the sector choice is derived from the comparison of the 
sector-dependent indirect utilities, as in Hausman (1985). Thus, the activity and labour 
decisions of workers have a similar structure to those of non-linear discrete-continuous 





obs is the observed sector of activity (1 = primary sector, 2 = secondary 
sector, 3 = non-participation and unemployment), h
obs is the observed labour supply, 
and R
obs is the observed non-wage activity income. (s
obs, h
obs, R
obs) is related to the 
latent model in the following paragraph where the unobserved variables are replaced by 
a zero. 
The worker works in the primary sector if her utility level in the primary sector 





y0) and U(c,¯, h,¯) ≥  U(y0, 0), where w
v(h) = R'(h) and µ
v(h) = R(h) – h w
v(h), are 
respectively the virtual wage and the net virtual activity income associated with the 
shadow linear budget constraint in the secondary sector for a level h of worked hours. y0 
is the level of unearned income, w is the observed wage in the primary sector and f is 
the fixed entry cost in the primary sector.  h is the level of rationed hours and   8
f     y   +   h    w =   c   0 −  is the consumption expenditure in the primary sector. The optimal 
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*). The worker is non-participant if 








obs) = (3, 0, 0).  
To simplify the estimation process, we consider that the case of unemployed 
workers is exterior to this structural model. Indeed, comparing indirect utilities implies 
that without job rationing, these workers would be included among workers in the 
primary or secondary sectors.  Then, the corresponding observations should satisfy 




*) + y0) ≥  U(y0, 0). However, explaining their 
unemployment status would require entry costs specific to these workers, in the primary 
and in the secondary sectors. Indeed, one may expect that it is more difficult to find a 
job when coming from unemployment status, which may be a signal of low 
productivity, and that therefore unemployed workers would suffer high entry costs into 
both activity sectors. Even when it is not the case, including unemployed workers in the 
model would hamper an already difficult estimation. Several estimation attempts have 
shown us that our data do not allow us to estimate such a full model
14. We choose rather 
to consider the job rationing process leading to unemployment as exogenous, which is 
equivalent to excluding unemployed workers from the sample used in the estimation. In 
the next section, we describe the utility function. 
2.3.  The utility function 
Several specifications of the utility function have been used in the labour supply 
literature. The linear form in income and wage (Hausman, 1981, Stern, 1986) presents 
deficiencies: low income individuals may exhibit a negative marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and hours of work, and for a sufficiently large wage 
rate, consumption becomes an inferior good. As a simple alternative to Hausman's form, 
we make use of the following class of utility functions, suggested by Blundell (1990) 
and used in Creedy and Duncan (1998). 
                                                 
14 Lanot and Muller (1996) is an example of an extended model that did not converge.   9
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where imposing β  > 0, 0 > γ  > - 1, is sufficient to ensure the convexity of preferences, a 
strictly positive marginal rate of substitution, and the normality of consumption good. 




    +   ln(w)     +     = h 
0 γ β α . 
Heterogeneity of preferences is introduced through the intercept term α . When 
the labour supply is strictly positive, the marginal rate of substitution ω (c, h) and the 
virtual income µ(c, h), associated with the separating hyperplane of the optimisation 
programme, are solutions to the system of equations: 
(3) 
h)   (c,
h)   (c,
    +   h))   (c, ln(     +     = h 
ω
µ
γ ω β α  and  
(4) c  =  ω (c, h) h + µ(c, h). 
The direct utility function can be obtained by 
(5)  U(c, h) = Ψ (ω (c, h), µ (c, h)), 
which yields the marginal utilities: 
(6)  ) h   (c,   =  
c
h)   U(c, γ ω
∂
∂
 and  ) h   (c,     =  
h




The second important functional form to specify is that of the earning function in 
the secondary sector. We now attend to this task. 
2.4.  The earnings function in the informal sector 
The functional form must first allow for decreasing returns to labour over a 
sufficiently wide range of hours to obtain a unique equilibrium in the secondary sector. 
Second, it must permit non-participation in the secondary sector, the marginal return to   10
labour at zero hours must be bounded
15. We use the earnings function introduced by 
Rosen (1976):  
(7)  R(h) = h exp(ξ  + δ  h), 
where ξ  and δ  are parameters. Constant returns are obtained when δ  = 0, and provided 
the individual time endowment is bound by a level T, positive marginal returns to 
labour and decreasing returns to labour are obtained if  0   <     <   /T 1   - δ . This yields a linear 
log-average-wage equation: 
(8)  h     +     =  
h
R(h)






The implicit wage rate in the secondary sector is R'(h) = (1 + δ  h)R(h)/h. We add 
exogenous explanatory variables and an error term to ξ , to incorporate deterministic and 
stochastic variations into (7). Finally, the virtual net activity income is obtained by 
substracting the shadow value of labour input. 
(9)  R(h) h        =   (h) R h      R(h)   =   (h)  
v δ µ − ′ − . 
We are now ready to present the data used for the estimation. 
3. The  Data 
Cameroon in 1993 is a lower-middle income economy (770 US$ of GNP per 
capita) in Africa. The data used in this paper are taken from a survey about the 
employment conditions of the population of Yaoundé, capital of Cameroon (DIAL-
DSCN, 1993). The survey was conducted by DIAL and the DSCN at the Finance 
Ministry of the Republic of Cameroon. 11,172 people in 1961 households were selected 
using a sampling scheme based on spatial tele-detection. The collection took place in 
January-February 1993. The survey provides information about the labour market status 
and the activity of every household member aged over 10. Among 7,865 individuals of 
                                                 
15 While the Cobb-Douglas specification meets the first requirement, it does not satisfy the second one 
since marginal return to labour tends to infinity when hours tend to zero. Non-parametric estimation of 
non-linear budget sets has been investigated by Blomquist and Newey (2002). In this paper, we follow a 
parametric approach.   11
more than 9 years old, 2,947 are occupied active members and 832 are unemployed. For 
the estimation, we focus on the married women or single female heads of household 
aged between 18 and 55. This leaves us with 1,225 individuals. 
These individuals in the primary sector (27 percent of the population) are wage 
earners, employed in the public sector, either in administration (64 percent) or in a state 
firm (12 percent), or employed in a private firm (24 percent). The secondary sector 
workers (18 percent of the population) are those who claim to be working either as 
small firm employers (less than 10 percent of the secondary sector workers) or as 
artisans. Unemployed workers (41 percent of the population) are: individuals reporting 
to have been searching for a job at least once during the four weeks before the 
interview, individuals claiming unavailability of jobs as a reason for not searching and 
individuals reporting to suffer from under-employment because of bad economic 
conditions. 14 percent of female workers decided not to participate in the labour market.  
We summarise this situation by assuming that salaried workers belong to the 
primary sector, whereas the secondary sector is composed of self-employed workers. 
Because of the importance of administration in Yaoundé, most (76 percent of) salaried 
workers are civil servants. The majority of these individuals work around 40 hours a 
week. Primary sector jobs in the private sector often share similar characteristics. In the 
secondary sector, the worker determines her labour supply that is equal to the work 
input of her firm. 
Table 1 gives details on the socio-economic characteristics of the sample by 
activity sector. The values obtained compare well with what is known of the labour 
market in Yaoundé (DIAL-DSCN, 1993a, 1993b). The mean level of household assets 
is slightly higher in the secondary sector than in the primary sector, consistently with 
the presence of physical capital to support informal activities. Non-working women 
correspond to a much lower level of household assets. 
The variance of the worked hours in the two sectors corresponds to what is 
recognised in the literature as the relatively stronger rigidity of hours in the primary 
sector. In the primary sector, 81 percent of the population works from 30 to 48 hours a 
week, with a strong mode at about 40 hours where we observe 65 percent of the sample. 
This justifies considering the hours worked per week rationed in the primary sector. In 
the secondary sector, we find 38 percent of the population working from 30 to 48 hours 
a week and the mode is at 60 hours where we observe 10 percent of the observations.    12






























































































































































































































































































































































































































* : in thousands of FCFA. 
Equations in Tables 2 and 3 are used for generating the predicted variables so as to replace missing values. 
Dependents are defined as individuals surveyed living with the household who are neither the head of household, nor his/her spouse 
nor the children of the household head.   13
Are those activity sectors chosen by the workers? DIAL-DSCN (1993a, 1993b) 
suggests that the workers often choose their activity sector for themselves. Indeed, 25 
percent of unemployed people who lost their job chose to quit voluntarily. Furthermore, 
less than 20 percent of the informal independent workers search for work in the 
informal sector because they had not found a salaried job in the modern sector.  
We now present the estimation results of wage equations for the two sectors, as a 
preliminary statistical analysis of the data and to provide predictions of these wages for 
workers not observed in the considered sector. For the primary sector, we estimate a 
log-wage equation on the continuous observations using an instrumental variable 
method to account for the possible endogeneity of experience. Inverse Mills’ ratios 
included to investigate the selectivity bias for the participation in the considered sector 
are not significant and have been excluded. The log-wage equation is estimated for the 
secondary sector with the average hourly income instead of the wage. Table 2 shows the 
OLS estimation results of the log-wage equations.
16 These equations are used as 
instrumental equations for missing values and workers observed in another sector. As 
expected, returns to education and experience are higher in the primary sector than in 
the secondary sector
17. 
Statistics of the predictions from the OLS estimates of the wage equations are 
shown in Table 1. The mean predicted unearned income and the mean predicted weekly 
wage rate of the female worker are higher in the primary sector than in the secondary 
one. Whatever the activity sector of the worker, on average her predicted primary sector 
wage rate is higher than her predicted secondary sector wage rate, which is consistent 
                                                 
 
16 The number of observations differ here from that of Table 1 because we used only the most precise 
indicators for wages and unearned incomes in the estimation, systematically eliminating the "zero" 
observations for incomes and inaccurate data (by classes) for wages. Indeed, we believe that, for this type 
of data, measurement error is a major problem and if not treated would lead to meaningless 
estimates.That is another reason for not treating explicitly the endogenous selectivity of the sample in 
these equations since some attrition bias already results from the calculus of indicators. There are two 
selection processes with those who do not work in the corresponding sector and those who work in this 
sector but did not answer their wage. Unfortunately, in both cases accurate instruments are not available 
to seriously identify these selection processes.  
17 The 2SLS estimates are rejected because of the results of Hausman tests which are shown in Table 7. In 
all cases, the exogeneity of education and experience cannot be rejected at usual level. This is also the 
case when the exogeneity of education and experience have been tested jointly with selectivity. The 
endogeneity of household composition is also rejected in these data. Table 6b shows that we are not in the 
case of weak instruments since the F-statistics of the first-stage regressions are always substantial. 
Selection correction and non-instrumentation of experience did not significantly change the results.   14
with dualism. However, primary workers gain more by being in this sector than other 
workers.  
Table 2: Log-wage equations 
 




































































Student’s t in parentheses. Wages are measured in thousand of FCFA per week. Only observations with 
exact wages and exact earnings are used in these regressions. Unaccounted missing information are 
dropped since they yield meaningless estimates. No selection correction for these missing values has 
been implemented because instrumental variables are not available to identify it with accuracy this 
selectivity. Data collected by using classes are converted by using mean values in these classes. 
 
Another important determinant of participation and activity choice should be 
unearned income since women who already dispose of a large unearned income have 
little incentive to reduce their leisure time. Observed unearned income is the sum of the 
woman's unearned income and the total income of the husband and of the dependents. 
Some women are observed with no unearned income. We assume that this is due to 
non-observation rather than to non-existence of the unearned income. We provide 
predictions for this unobserved information ("predicted unearned income") by 
estimating an unearned income equation. The results of this estimation are presented in 
Table 3.  The existence of  a significant  selection effect  using a conventional Heckman    15
















































































































































































































































































Number of observations  956    956 
Because of missing values for non-labour income, the sample size (956) is smaller than that of the whole sample (1225).   16
2-steps method is rejected. The endogeneity of household composition and head’s 
characteristics cannot be rejected by Hausman’s tests (see Table 7). However, the 2SLS 
estimates of the coefficients are almost all insignificant and family background 
variables may not be valid instruments since they may be correlated with unobserved 
ability. Then, the predictions for unearned income are obtained using the OLS estimates 
on complete observations only. Now that we have presented the method for generating 
the predictions for wages and incomes, we proceed to the estimation of the structural 
model. 
4.  Estimation of the Structural Model 
4.1.  Some econometric difficulties 
Several econometric difficulties have to be dealt with for the functional and 
stochastic specification of the model. First, the selectivity bias has been well 
documented for the standard labour supply model (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1986). 
Chiswick (1988) proposes to incorporate, in an analysis of earnings, those labour force 
participants who are self-employed, and thus he avoids the selection bias in the earning 
functions estimates that arises when the sample is restricted to wage earners. We go 
further with all sector choices simultaneously estimated. Nonetheless, the possible 
endogeneity of household composition may stochastically link this composition with 
activity sector and labour supply. For example, new members from outside may join the 
richer households, whose female workers are predominantly active in the primary 
sector. Unfortunately, our data do not enable us to correct for these parasite links, and 
we ignore them. 
Second, identification conditions have to be imposed in switching response 
models. In our case, because of the highly non-linear character of our model, it is not 
possible to globally identify many parameters with accuracy. In view of this, we limit 
the number of exogenous variables in this model to ease parameter identification. 
Additionally, the correct derivation of the likelihood from the errors distribution 
involves the imposition of logical coherency to the model (Gouriéroux, Laffont, 
Monfort, 1980). Logical coherency is satisfied if the parameter values correspond to a 
unique optimum for each value of the errors and vice versa. This condition is obtained   17
by assuming the strict concavity of the utility function and of the earnings function
18, 
and by the fact that the stochastic state defined by the equality of utility levels in two 
different sectors has a null probability. 
Third, one limitation of the model is that the identification is obtained from a 
specific choice of functional forms and distribution assumptions. In particular, the 
unobserved heterogeneity is incorporated in the three error terms. Clearly, the choice of 
functional forms and distributions matters for the model characteristics. However, in the 
absence of a priori information, we try to select the most appropriate specification in 
terms of simplicity and reasonable properties. This approach is a first step towards more 
realistic, but less tractable specifications. 
Fourth, we adopt the following simplifying strategy to deal with wages, rationed 
hours and activity incomes when they are unobserved. The definition of the rationing 
level in the primary sector for workers who are observed in this sector is the observed 
level of hours. The rationed hours in the primary sector for workers not observed in this 
sector are predicted at the mean of hours observed in the primary sector. The wage rate 
in the primary sector of workers unobserved in this sector are predicted using the 
estimated log-wage equation in Table 2. The non-labour income for workers for which 
it is unobserved is predicted using the estimated income equation in Table 3. Naturally, 
this approach ignores the potential selectivity in these equations
19. However, since 
including these equations in the global model would be intractable, we can thus obtain 
reasonable predictions for these variables. The secondary sector earnings for those who 
do not report it are directly predicted using eq. (7) of the model, which is estimated 
simultaneously with the preferences and the entry cost. With these econometric 
difficulties in mind, we proceed with the calculation of the likelihood of the model.  
4.2.  The likelihood function and the exogenous variables 
The full model is given by the inequalities between the utility levels in the 
different sectors, as defined in Section 2.2 with the utility function (1) and the earnings 
function (7) in the secondary sector. The maximum likelihood method used in the 
                                                 
18 As noticed by Heim and Meyer (2003) for Hausman’s labour supply model under nonlinear budget 
constraint. 
19 Two-stage Heckman estimates including Mill ratios have induced us to reject the selectivity, although 
in a non-structural way.   18
estimation is discussed in Appendix 1. The three stochastic terms are related to the 
structural parameters of the model: the heterogeneity of preferences, α , the scale of the 
earnings function, ξ , and the fixed cost, f. Parameters α , ξ  and f are supposed to be 
linear in the error terms and in some individual characteristics, and to be distributed 
according to a trivariate normal distribution. 
However, more restrictions must be imposed on this model to make its 
estimation tractable. Indeed, it is not possible to identify with accuracy all the 
parameters related to the explanatory variables when they are simultaneously included 
in the preferences, the technology and the entry cost. Therefore, we introduce each 
exogenous explanatory variable only in one of these structures. Earnings (or wage rates) 
are explained by the usual variables in the human capital theory (age, education level, 
experience), and also, in the case of the informal sector, by the capital stock of the 
individual firm, approximated by household assets. We are also interested in children 
whose presence generates incentives to the mother to take care of them, and in other 
female members who might substitute themselves for the female workers in domestic 
activities. Then, we assume that the preferences of the female worker depend on the 
number of children and on the number of female members (both categories split up in 
two age classes), on the woman’s age and on a dummy variable for married women. 
Indeed, age is generally considered a major determinant of preferences and the presence 
of a husband is expected to influence female worker decisions in Cameroon. As for the 
entry cost, our attempts at statistically identifying explanatory variables have failed. 
Therefore, we assume that it is a constant parameter whose measurement unit is Franc 
CFA. Its variance may also be considered a measure of the heterogeneity of the budget 
constraint specific to the primary sector. A dual interpretation of the fixed cost suggests 
that it may partially account for the unobserved heterogeneity in hours rationing in the 
primary sector. We now examine the estimation results.    19
4.3. Estimation  results 
Table 4 shows one typical estimate of the model.
20 The parameters β and (1/γ ), 
which are related to the economic variables in the implicit labour supply equation, i.e. 
the predicted implicit wage and the predicted unearned income, are well determined
21. 
The number of young children under 4 years of age has a negative effect on the 
propensity to work, which may reflect their need for caring by the female worker. In 
contrast, the number of children between 4 and 10 years of age, the number of female 
members and the fact that the individual is married, correspond to incentives to work 
when they are high. The latter effect may be related to the adverse economic 
conjuncture with a steady rise of unemployment in the studied period, since married 
women may be losing advantages linked to the husband’s job, while non-married 
workers do not suffer from this shock. The presence of other female members may ease 
the substitutability of the female worker's labour in domestic activities. Age has no 
significant effect on work decisions, perhaps because of compensation effects in the life 
cycle. We cannot capture the latter effects in our model because age and age squared are 
too correlated for being accurately identified. 
The fixed costs are identified by the structure that we impose on preferences and 
technology. Because of the high non-linearity of the model, we have not been able to 
obtain estimates for the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters when explanatory 
variables have been included in the fixed costs, even when the convergence is reached.
22  
                                                 
20 Because of all the non-linearities involved in the model, the computation is time consuming. The 
precision required for the integration and for the root calculation makes it variable. One week of 
calculation time with GAUSS on a SUN-SPARC station is a typical duration for one estimation. The 
region of convergence had also to be reached by grid method and likelihood concentration methods so as 
to compensate the inaccuracy of the gradient method near the optimum. Note also that the algorithm for a 
similar model with hours freely chosen in the primary sector does not converge. An alternative method to 
improve the estimation of the integrals in the likelihood could have been to use simulated likelihood 
estimators like in Pradhan (1999). 
21 The standard errors shown in the table do not account for the fact that some data on wages and non-
labour income are predicted. 
22 Note that to the best of our knowledge, nobody has yet succeeded in estimating fixed cost functions in 
such non-linear models. This may explain why Newman and Gertler (1994) eliminate the budget 
constraint in their model and rely on comparisons of implicit log-wages based on linear specifications. 
One reason for this difficulty is that only very rich data sets could identify with accuracy both the 
parameters in the linear budget constraint and in a non-linear production function included in this budget 
constraint. Indeed, the corresponding Fisher information matrix has columns that are likely to be very 
correlated, leading to its quasi-singularity and the impossibility of estimating the variance-covariance 
matrix of parameters.    20







Number of children (0-3)  -5.52 
(2.9) 
Number of children (4-10)  4.25 
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ρ ξ ,f  -0.66 
(2.6) 
 
Mean log-likelihood = -3.64. Number of observations = 1206. Absolute t-values in parentheses. 
A few outliers (19) have been discarded from the sample so as to reach the convergence point. To ease the optimisation algorithm 
behaviour, some variables have been rescaled: hours are per week, wages in thousands of FCFA, assets in millions of FCFA, 
education and age in years. This must be taken into account when interpreting the above estimates.   21
Moreover, the constant fixed cost coefficient is not significant at 5% level. However, its 
estimate is 4.4 percent of the non-labour income for primary sector workers, 11 percent 
for workers in secondary sectors, and respectively 6.6 percent and 8.3 percent for non-
participants and unemployed workers. This is consistent with the contribution of the 
entry cost to the selection of workers since it corresponds to a relatively lower financial 
burden for actually observed primary workers. Workers whose fixed cost is a relatively 
larger financial constraint, compared to their financial capacity without wage income, 
and who may not access to the primary sector, seem to be rejected more often in the 
secondary sector than in inactivity. The large variance σ
2
f indicates that the amount of 
fixed costs any individual face can be very variable.  
In view of these difficulties in estimating the entry cost, one may wonder if the 
introduction of an entry cost is justified. We tried to estimate the model without the 
entry cost, but in that case it is not even possible to reach the convergence of the 
likelihood optimisation, except towards nonsensical estimates, because the simplified 
model does not fit the data well. A fortiori the estimation of a model without hours 
rationing does not converge. Without an entry cost in the primary sector, it is impossible 
to explain, with the model and the available exogenous variables, why workers whose 
productivity in the secondary sector and reservation wages are low are not observed as 
working in the primary sector. Indeed, without barriers to sector entry the only reason 
for a worker observed as non-participating or in the informal sector not to enter the 
primary sector would be either that the wage rate is too low compared to its reservation 
wage (or to the shadow wage that she could get from informal activities), or that the 
level of rationed hours is too far from her desired level. This is unlikely in our context, 
since primary jobs are much better remunerated than secondary jobs and observed 
workers are generally poor enough to be willing to work if the primary sector is 
available. Clearly, the entry cost is needed to explain job rationing in the primary sector, 
although our data do not enable us to describe well the heterogeneity of situations 
associated with this rationing. Here, the non-significance of the fixed cost parameter 
does not mean that it should be zero, but rather that more information is needed to 
identify it with accuracy.  
However, one may want to simplify the model more. What would happen 
without the entry cost, the hours rationing and the non-linearity of the earnings 
function? In this situation, we would be back to a model based on the comparison of the 
reservation wage with the wage rates in the two sectors. In that case, most observed 
workers should want to work in the primary sector, when the estimated wage equations   22
are used for predicting their wage in the primary sector. Then, such a simple model 
would fail to explain the existence of a large secondary sector and a large 
unemployment level. Also, a model with a linear earnings function in the secondary 
sector would not fit the data well. For example, such a model would exaggerate the 
rewards of working in the secondary sector for workers wishing to work a large number 
of hours. Besides, the existence of diminishing returns to labour in this sector is of 
major interest in the study of the informal sector. Introducing only the non-linearity in 
the earnings function and the hours rationing in the primary sector would not 
substantially modify the relative attractiveness of the primary sector. Therefore, the 
entry cost, or an equivalent device, seems to be essential to the model. 
The third estimated structure is the earnings function in the secondary sector. 
Household assets, which are a proxy for the capital stock of the firm, are statistically 
significant, suggesting the inadequacy of the usual wage rate approach. The experience 
and the education of the female worker positively influence the productivity, which was 
not the case for the direct estimates of the wage rate equation of the secondary sector
23. 
Parameter δ  is significantly negative, which implies that the earnings function is strictly 
concave. However, the estimated curvature of the earning function is very moderate. 
This may be caused by two features of the studied context. First, the informal sector is 
an aggregate of heterogeneous activities, with some workers receiving very variable 
remunerations and other ones paid at almost a fixed wage rate. The contribution of these 
last workers in the likelihood pushes the estimates towards a zero curvature. Second, as 
in organisational dualism theories, the earnings of the female worker may be shared 
with other members of the family, and the average shadow wage or a fraction of the 
shadow wage may sometimes be closer to the characteristics of the decision process, 
than the actual shadow earnings function that is therefore imprecisely determined by our 
individualistic model. Nonetheless, the log-linear shadow wage equations, which are 
generally used in the literature, are likely to be misspecified.  
We can compare the returns to education and experience obtained from the 
earnings function estimation by using the average shadow wage, R(h)/h, with the 
returns obtained in the wage equations. Indeed, wages in wage equations are also 
calculated as means over hours. The comparison with the marginal shadow wages 
(R'(h)) can also be made by multiplying the returns obtained for the average shadow 
                                                 
23 However, as we indicated above, this may also come from the impossibility of identifying the effects of 
these variables in preferences.   23
wage by (1+δh), with h chosen, for example, at the mean hours for the population of 
interest. In practice, this makes only a small difference because the value of parameter δ 
is close to zero.  
The estimated returns to education in the secondary sector are much larger than 
had been obtained in the wage equation (11 % instead of 4.8 %), and even more than the 
return to education in the wage equations from the primary sector, suggesting that the 
global model overestimates these returns, or that the wage equation underestimates 
them. The source of this possible overestimation is unclear, but it may be that part of the 
influence of the education variable should be attributed to preferences shift rather than 
to productivity differences. For example, more educated workers in the informal sector 
could prefer to work fewer hours and then have a larger productivity in presence of 
diminishing returns to labour.  
Conversely, the return to experience calculated from the estimated earnings 
function appears much lower than the estimates for the wage equation in the secondary 
sector (0.4 % instead of 1.2 %). The difficulty of introducing explanatory variables of 
the entry barriers in the formal sector may be at the origin of this. Indeed, workers with 
a high level of experience should be less subject to such barriers. Then, workers with 
high experience observed in the secondary sector often have bad unobserved 
characteristics that both explain why they cannot access the primary sector and why 
their productivity is low in the secondary sector. 
Finally, the correlation coefficients between preferences, fixed cost and 
technology are all significant. Owing to the identification restrictions that were 
necessary for the convergence of the estimation, these correlation coefficients partly 
reveal the influence of exogenous variables that should be introduced in several of the 
three main structures, rather than in only one of them as is the case now. A second 
interpretation of these coefficients is that they reflect unobserved heterogeneity common 
to preferences, informal technology and entry cost. The estimated magnitude of the 
correlation coefficient of the entry cost and of the informal technology, ρξ,f, is 
substantial, while the sign of the coefficient is negative. This suggests that unobserved 
characteristics may simultaneously explain worker productivity in the informal sector 
and low levels of entry costs in the formal sector. Then, when possible, one should 
incorporate in the model more information on qualification, human capital and 
characteristics that are related to productivity gains in both sectors. What is described as 
an entry barrier may sometimes come from unobserved differences in productivity,   24
rather than for example arbitrary discrimination. In that sense, education and experience 
appear to be insufficient characterisation of the productivity characteristics of workers. 
The coefficients of correlations of ξ and f with the preference parameter α are 
also interesting, even if their magnitudes are weaker. Preferences and productivity in the 
informal sector are negatively correlated, while preferences are positively correlated 
with the entry cost. This is consistent with the presence of unobserved characteristics of 
human capital simultaneously explaining differences in tastes, and productivity in the 
two activity sectors. Thus, the results support joint modelling as a response to 
simultaneously unobserved heterogeneity of preferences, technology and entry costs.  
Since the data do not allow us to estimate the parameters of the fixed cost with 
accuracy, one could wonder if the specification of a fixed cost is justified for treating 
the rationing in the formal sector. Other modelling approaches could be tried, such as 
exogenous rationing, introduction of a probability of being rationed, and a shift in the 
preferences when entering the primary sector. All these possible solutions share 
unattractive features in that they introduce exogenous determination of the sector choice 
and/or correspond to unintuitive representations of barriers to entry in the primary 
sector. We mentioned earlier the difficulties involved in the elimination of the fixed cost 
altogether.  
On the whole, we believe that the three new introduced elements (fixed costs, 
hours rationing, non-linearity of the earnings function) are important. However, linear 
reduced-form models remain useful approaches because they allow a large number of 
explanatory variables even if the interpretation is difficult since these variables may 
originate from different underlying structures. The impossibility of including all 
explanatory variables is the reason why we do not attempt to compare our results 
directly with a linear reduced-form approach. We prefer to focus on the structural 
properties of our model rather than on the robustness of the effects. It seems that except 
when very rich data are available, a choice between the structural relevance of the 
model and a complete set of exogenous explanatory variables is inevitable. In that 
sense, there exists a trade-off in terms of theoretical relevance against goodness-of-fit, 
results of statistical tests and capacity to incorporate many correlates. In the state of the 
present modelling knowledge, a complex non-linear model cannot compete yet in terms 
of pure statistical adequation with linear regressions incorporating many regressors. 
However, as opposed to simple equations, it provides specific qualitative features of 
interest (concavity, diminishing returns, barrier to entry) and a framework of 
interpretation. Moreover, endogeneity problems in reduced-forms and the   25
insufficiencies arising from the methods of instrumental variables (Staiger and Stock, 
1997) raise doubts about the results obtained in reduced-form regressions. 
Investigations such as the one presented in this paper are likely to guide future 
specifications. We now examine the predicted elasticities generated by the estimated 
model. 
4.4. Predicted  elasticities 
Table 5 provides several measures of elasticities based on the separation 
structure of the optimisation programme, for the mean worker in each of the three 
sectors of interest. They are estimates of elasticities of labour supply and elasticities of 
earnings
24. Moreover, we also calculated predicted actual and virtual wages and 
incomes for these workers. All these estimates characterise the potential labour supply 
responses and the corresponding revenues for the mean worker in each sector, under the 
assumption that there is no change of regime, and in reference to simplified constraints 
(the implicit separating hyperplane associated with the optimisation programme). It 
must be remembered that the above elasticities characterise latent supply functions 
rather than observable elasticities that should account for the non-separability of the 
system and the changes in regime. They provide, however, useful analytical information 
about the estimated system. We calculate these elasticities by using as the level of 
worked hours h the mean observed labour supply, and by using the other mean 
characteristics, in each sub-population. For the non-participant and the unemployed, we 
account for the fact that their reservation rate should be higher than the proposed 
shadow wage rate (in the absence of fixed costs and hours rationing) by using the 
highest of the predicted wage rates for the primary and the secondary sectors
25. Let us 
now comment on these calculated elasticities, which are all statistically significant at 
5% level, as the standard errors show, except in the case of the secondary sector for the 
elasticities of hours with respect to preferences characteristics and of earnings with 
respect to technology characteristics. 
                                                 
24 The obtained elasticities of labour demand are too negative (about –10) to be credible and are not 
shown. Clearly, more information, perhaps about technology characteristics, is needed to estimate labour 
demand elasticities with accuracy in this data. 
25 Direct uses of behavioural micro-simulations such as the ones surveyed in Creedy and Duncan (1998), 
would be possible although cumbersome and computation time consuming. We do not follow this 
approach because the estimation results are not accurate enough to justify to overcome these obstacles, 
keeping in mind that the prediction errors in such simulations would be very large and would probably 
include a notable component coming from misspecification problems.    26
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∞  means that the elasticities tend to the infinity when the worked hours tend to zero. Standard errors based on the estimation are in 
parentheses. In some cases, the wages and earnings are merely sample means that do not depend on the result of the maximum 
likelihood estimation, which explain why standard errors are not provided for these cases. 
 
The wage elasticities of the labour supply in the primary sector (0.371) or in the 
secondary sector (0.497) compare well with traditional figures (Killingsworth, 1983, 
Blundell, 1992). They correspond to virtual situations where only the implicit budget 
constraint (without fixed costs or hours rationing) is considered. Since γ  < 0, this 
elasticity is higher for low exogenous non-labour incomes and lower for high labour 
supply levels, other variables fixed. It is also higher for workers observed in the 
secondary sector because their wage rate is much lower, which is far from being fully   27
compensated by a lower exogenous income and larger worked hours. So, informal and 
less wealthy workers would react more to wage changes if there were no constraint by 
entry and technology barriers. 
The elasticity of the labour supply with respect to the exogenous unearned 
income is lower in absolute value in the primary sector (-0.186) than in the secondary 
sector (-0.311). This is due, as previously, to a higher wage rate in the primary sector. 
For the non-participants and the unemployed, the wage elasticity of labour supply tends 
to plus infinity and the exogenous income elasticity of labour supply tends to minus 
infinity, when the worked hours tend to zero. This is because the number of worked 
hours appear at the denominator in the formulae of these elasticities since entry costs are 
neglected when focusing on one regime. Such a feature illustrates the importance of 
entry costs. Alternatively, different functional forms (more difficult to estimate) could 
have been chosen to avoid this situation. 
Because of the moderate concavity of the earnings function, the elasticity of the 
potential earnings with respect to worked hours in the informal sector is close to one in 
all sectors for the mean household. The potential earnings in the informal sector result 
from the latent labour demand of the individual firm in this sector. In each sector, the 
shadow wage rate of the informal sector income is lower than the mean predicted wage 
rate. It is much higher for workers observed in the formal sector than for workers 
observed in the informal sector, because of the higher education, experience and assets 
of the former. Then, the incentives to work in the secondary sector for primary workers 
would be higher than for secondary workers, if the primary sector did not exist or were 
to disappear. In a time of employment crisis with liquidation of part of the public sector, 
such as the studied period in Cameroon, this is consistent with massive migration of 
dismissed workers from the primary towards the secondary sector. That is indeed what 
has been recorded in employment surveys (DIAL-DSCN, 1993a, b) 
Finally, for each sector, the activity income provided by the potential informal 
activities of the female worker is on average relatively small as compared to her 
exogenous income, even when substracting the entry cost in the formal sector. Indeed, 
in addition to the non-activity incomes of the households, the labour incomes of the 
other members of the family, and particularly of the husband, constitute most of the 
family income. This implies that a more complete analysis of female activity decisions 
would benefit from considering the activity decisions of other members.   28
5. Conclusion 
Modelling labour supply and activity choices in the dualistic context of 
developing countries raises complex econometric issues, especially when one allows for 
the presence of a non-linear earning function in the informal sector, allied to quasi-
autarky of labour in this sector, and entry costs and hours rationing in the formal sector. 
This explains why no model dealing jointly with these characteristics has been 
estimated until now. This paper is a first attempt at such a task. 
Using a cross-section sample of female workers from Yaoundé (Cameroon), we 
estimate a joint model of activity choice and labour supply, where the error terms in 
preferences, entry cost and informal technology are correlated. This approach is proven 
tractable and our results provide evidence for the concavity of the earnings function in 
the informal sector with respect to the hours. We estimate the effects of several 
explanatory variables for the preferences and for the earnings function in this 
simultaneous structural estimation, and we derive elasticities for different sectors.  
However, the approach shows its limits in that strong identifying restrictions 
must be imposed on the list of exogenous variables in each structure of the model. In 
this sense, there exists an inevitable trade-off between, on the one hand the consistency 
and completeness of the economic model, and on the other hand, the incorporation of 
relevant information about the worker characteristics through exogenous variables.  
The difficulty of obtaining accurate estimates for structural models with joint 
estimation of preferences, entry costs and technology raises doubts about the 
interpretation of the estimates of reduced-form models
26. Indeed, if one believes that the 
structural model is correct, or that its possible misspecification is of little importance, as 
compared to the roughness of the reduced-form approach, then its estimation should 
provide more efficient, and perhaps more consistent, estimates than reduced-forms. 
Then, the discrepancy between high correlation results obtained in reduced-form models 
and low significance obtained with the joint structural modelling can be attributed to 
several causes. First, the structural model is too imperfect and these imperfections do 
not appear in the reduced-form specification. The problem here is that the meaning of 
                                                 
26 Recently, Belzil and Hansen (2002) showed estimation results of a structural model of education and 
work choices for US workers that contradict the usual estimated returns for schooling in reduced-form 
wage equations.   29
the reduced-form specification is often implicitly or explicitly interpreted in reference to 
a metaphoric structural economic model. This raises the question: How can the 
structural model be wrong and its reduced-form consequence right? Another possibility 
is that the general structural model is correct, but its implementation is faulty. For 
example, badly specified error terms, inadequate functional forms or incorrect 
estimation methods may have been used. This type of error is possible in the present 
state of the difficult estimation of structural models. But again, why would these 
problems affect only the structural model and not the reduced-form model? Third, the 
bulk of the problem may come from the way reduced-form estimates are considered. 
Take for example the basic labour supply equation incorporating wage rate, exogenous 
income, household composition, age, experience and education. It may be that the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients in this equation should be more complex 
than is usually supposed. The effects of age and education are generally considered as 
characterising the female worker preferences, or labour market characteristics. 
However, in LDCs with imperfect labour market, such variables may be correlated with 
productivity in informal technology, levels of productive assets and entry costs in 
various activity sectors. Therefore, all these elements should be taken into account when 
interpreting the results of reduced-form models. Unfortunately, mixing explanations 
does not generally clarify the analysis of estimates. We leave this discussion here. 
What we should aim for is to reach the same type of empirical results, at least 
qualitatively, for complex activity choice models and simple reduced-form models, so 
as to cross-validate the estimation results of both approaches. For this, more progress in 
the estimation of structural models is needed.   30
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Appendix 1: The Likelihood 
We describe the contributions to the likelihood of each regime. The stochastic terms are 
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where  ,  α f , ξ  are respectively the means of the parameters α, f and ξ for the preferences, the 
secondary sector earnings function and the fixed cost. § is the variance-covariance matrix of the 
three random parameters. We start with the contribution to the likelihood of female workers 
observed in the primary sector. 
Primary Sector Workers: 
This regime is such that the following inequalities are fulfilled: 
(11)  )   ; y   +   )   );   , (   h (   ),   );   , (   h (   w (     )   ; h   (f),   c U( 0
* v * v α ξ ξ α µ ξ ξ α α Ψ ≥ , 
with h
* (α , ξ ) such that: 
)   ;   y   +   )   );   , ( h (     ),   );   , ( h ( w h(   =   )   , (   h 0
* v * v * α ξ ξ α µ ξ ξ α ξ α  and  
)   0;   , y  U(   )   ; h   (f),   c U( 0 α α ≥ , 
where we have extended our notation to take into account the dependence on the error terms in 
α , ξ  and f and where w
v and µ
v are short notations for ω (.,.) and µ(.,.) defined as the solution of 
(3) and (4). Then,  )   ;    )   );   , ( h (     ),   );   , ( h ( w ( h
* v * v * α ξ ξ α µ ξ ξ α  is obtained from (2). The 
consumption level in the primary sector,  (f)   c , corresponds to the fixed cost f and the worked 
hours rationed at  h   . Then,  (f)   c = w h +y0 -f. Given a value of α , the second inequality gives 
us an upper bound for the fixed cost, f1
M(α ). This quantity does not depend on the scale of 
production described by ξ . Provided the Slutsky condition is satisfied, this bound is unique. 
Therefore, for any value of the fixed cost less than f1
M(α ) and any value of α , the upper bound 
for the production scale can be defined, ξ 1
M(α , f).    35
In the optimisation programme, the upper and lower bounds in the integrals (in this 
regime and the other ones) are numerically computed using a combination of bissection and 
Newton-Raphson method. 
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The parameters with an upper bar denote the linear combination of the exogenous 
variables and of the coefficients to estimate. 
Φ  (respectively φ ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (respectively 
probability density function) and φ 2[., ., ρ ] is the bivariate standard normal probability density 
function. The matrices ∑11,  ∑12,  ∑21 are relevant sub-matrices of ∑ corresponding to well-
known results on the conditional distribution of multivariate normal random variables. We now 
turn to the regime corresponding to the secondary sector workers. 
Secondary Sector Workers 
For the secondary sector workers, we assume that the earnings function depends non-
linearly on the labour supplied, which is endogenous to our model. The description of the 
probability for this regime follows a similar approach to that of the previous regime. The 
following equations characterise a self-employed worker in the secondary sector: 
(13)  )   ; h   (f),   c  U(   )   ; y   +     );   , (   h (   ),   );   , (   h ( w ( 0
* v * v α α ξ ξ α µ ξ ξ α ≥ Ψ , 
)   );   );   , (   h (   ),   ); , (   h ( w h(   =   )   , (   h
* v * v * α ξ ξ α µ ξ ξ α ξ α , 
)   );   , (   h R(   =   )   , (   R
* * ξ ξ α ξ α  defines the activity income in the secondary sector. 
Given the values of α  and ξ  that solve the latter two equations, the inequality enables us 
to define a unique lower bound for the value of the fixed cost, f2
m (α , ξ ). The contribution to the 
likelihood is 
(14)  , J       ,   ,
e
, e    
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f,2 ξ α , 
and where J is the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the transformation of the error terms in 
α  and ξ  into the observed values h
* and R
*. For other regimes, the Jacobian is simple enough to 
be directly incorporated in the formulae of the contributions to the likelihood. While the sub-
matrices ∑ij (i = 1; j = 1, 2) are different from their counterparts of the previous section, they are 
defined with the same convention where i corresponds to the line number of the block and j to 
its column number. 
(15) 
) h   +   (2   y       +       -   )) h   +   (2       -   )   +   (1   ) h   +   ((1   ) h   +   (1  
) h   +   (1 h  
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with  . e   =   h + * δ ξ ∆  
The likelihood of the self-employed workers can be slightly changed to account for the 
fact that the observed revenue lies inside a given range. Since the scale of the revenue function 
lies in a range [ξ
m, ξ
M], the likelihood L2b is such that 
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Φ ∫ , 
where J2b results from the change in variables from α  to h
*. 
Non-Participants 
The regime is described by the following inequalities 
(17)  )   ; h   (f),   c  U( >   )   0;   , y U( 0 α α  and  )   (0; w   >   )   0;   , y (
v
0 ξ α ω . 
Given α , it is possible to define a lower bound for the fixed costs, f3
m (α ), and an upper 
bound for the scale of the revenue function, ξ 3
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Appendix 2  































































t-values in parentheses. The instruments are the number of children, the number of children 
aged from 0 to 3, from 4 to 10, from 11 to 15, the education level of parents, the occupation of 
the father, the age and education of the husband. One could argue that children cannot be 
considered as exogenous if they are simultaneously determined with education and work 
decisions. Finally, family background is likely to be correlated with unobserved ability.    38
Table 6b: Instrumental regressions 
Primary Sector  Education level  Primary 
Education 
Superior 
Education  Experience 
Intercept  10.258 (0.000)  0.169 (0.004) 0.0784  (0.227) 10.893  (0.00) 
Husband’s age  -0.0554 (0.008)  0.00232 (0.235)  -0.00652 (0.007)  -0.00311 (0.93) 
Husband’s education  0.295 (0.000)  -0.139 (0.006)  0.0313 (0.000)  -0.0352 (0.72) 
Children 0-3 years  -0.399 (0.328)  0.0194 (0.613)  -0.0758 (0.106)  -1.848 (0.015) 
Children 4-10 years  -0.618 (0.105)  0.0153 (0.669)  -0.0731 (0.095)  -0.116 (0.869) 
Children 11-15 years  -0.734 (0.034)  0.0284 (0.379)  -0.0495 (0.210)  1.750 (0.006) 
Total number of children  0.267 (0.283)  -0.0171 (0.464)  0.0314 (0.272)  0.368 (0.42) 
Education of the father  0.161 (0.004)  -0.00583 (0.265)  0.0197 (0.002)  0.0291 (0.77) 
Profession of the father  0.0129 (0.872)  0.0100 (0.184)  0.00683 (0.459)  -0.0699 (0.64) 
      
R
2  0.294 0.101 0.250 0.165 
F  9.70 (0.0000)  2.62 (0.0096)  7.77 (0.0000)  4.44 (0.0001) 
Number of observations  195  195  195  195 
 
Secondary Sector  Education level  Primary 
Education 
Superior 
Education  Experience 
Intercept  6.472 (0.000)  0.647 (0.000) -0.0170  (0.649) 6.188  (0.001) 
Husband’s age  -0.706 (0.000)  0.00531 (0.031)  -0.00127 (0.162)  0.119 (0.006) 
Husband’s education  0.410 (0.000)  -0.0389 (0.000)  0.0134 (0.000)  -0.343 (0.055) 
Children 0-3 years  0.153 (0.797)  -0.140 (0.073) -0.0571  (0.051) -0.375  (0.785) 
Children 4-10 years  0.257 (0.596)  -0.0348 (0.582)  0.0222 (0.347)  1.335 (0.253) 
Children 11-15 years  -0.213 (0.452)  0.00991 (0.789)  0.00832 (0.546)  1.574 (0.017) 
Total number of children  -0.386 (0.249)  0.0770 (0.080)  -0.00127 (0.938)  -0.463 (0.552) 
Education of the father  0.132 (0.150)  -0.00161 (0.893)  0.0198 (0.000)  0.124 (0.391) 
Profession of the father  -0.0334 (0.709)  0.00550 (0.638)  -0.00630 (0.149)  -0.178 (0.001) 
        
R
2 0.325  0.229  0.338  0.187 
F  (Prob > F)  6.98 (0.000)  3.80 (0.0006) 6.52  (0.000) 2.86  (0.0067) 
Number of observations  111  111  111  111 
P-values in parentheses. The values of the R
2 and F statistics shows that we are not in the case of weak instruments in the sense of 
Staiger and Stock (1997).   39
Table 7: Hausman Tests 
Test 
P-value for the wage or non-labour 
income equation in the informal 
sector 
P-value for the wage or non-labour 
income equation in the formal 
sector 
    
A 0.982  0.986 
    
B 0.484  0.904 
    
C 0.214  0.617 
    
D 0.152  0.449 
    
E 0.264  0.828 
    
F 0.0006  0.0017 
    
A,B, C, D, E are exogeneity tests for the wage equation. F is an exogeneity test of the non-labour 
equation. 
A: Exogeneity tests of equations where the selectivity has been controled by including an inverse 
Mill’s ratio. Then, selectivity and exogeneity can be simultaneously tested. Age is considered as 
exogenous. The possibly endogenous regressors are: education and experience and the Mills’s ratio. 
The instruments are: household composition, education and activity sectors of the parents.  
B: Idem than A with experience assumed exogenous.  
C: Exogeneity test of education and experience without Mill’s ratio.  
D: Idem than C with experience assumed exogenous.  
E: : Idem than A with household composition possibly endogenous.  
F: Exogeneity test of the education and household composition variables in the non-labour equation 
The instruments are the characteristics of the two parents: education, experience, ethnic group, 
region of origin, ability to speak French, sector and activity, household size of the family in which 
they were raised. 